Fiscal discipline is a public good in federations. As with all public goods, there is a free-riding risk. Hence the need for discipline-inducing mechanisms. EU countries decided to adopt a rule-based framework, which is currently heavily criticised and which may come under further pressure with the enlargement of the EU. The paper reconsider the debates which took place before the approval of the Maastricht Treaty and asks whether market mechanisms can be relied upon as a fall-back solution in case of rule-failure. The issue is tackled in three steps. First, the conditions for an effective market solution are examined and the European institutional framework is assessed against them. Second, the relationship between fiscal performance, credit rating and interest rates is discussed, with reference to both what is expected in theory and what is found in practice. Finally, governments' sensitivity to market signals is assessed. The paper concludes that, although interest rates react to fiscal imbalances, the extent of the reaction is small and it is unlikely that governments respond promptly. Therefore, market mechanisms cannot be relied upon for replacing fiscal rules. However, greater transparency in fiscal accounts can allow markets to usefully complements rules.
Introduction
Sound fiscal policies are considered a precondition for monetary and financial stability. Fiscal misbehaviour may undermine the credibility of the Central Bank's commitment to monetary stability. A high public debt may induce pressure for both ex-ante bail-out (refraining from raising interest rates under inflationary tensions) and ex-post bail-out (debt relief through unanticipated inflation). Unsustainable fiscal policies have often been at the root of episodes of high inflation or even hyperinflation.
In situations where a number of governments share the same currency and retain autonomy in matters of public expenditure, taxation and recourse to debt, the stability of monetary and financial conditions represents a public good. Governments individually face a less steep interest rate schedule in a monetary union than under flexible exchange rates. There is an incentive for each government to exploit the benefits accruing from the discipline of others without complying with the rules.
Hence the need for discipline-inducing mechanisms.
The pros and cons of fiscal rules at the national level have long been debated. Both theoretical and empirical work reached ambiguous results. 1 However, when European monetary union (EMU) was devised, the need for rules counteracting undisciplined fiscal behaviour was widely recognised. 2 Several of the founding members of the EMU had a bad fiscal record. Past experience suggested not to rely on market mechanisms. In 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht set the fiscal criteria to be met in order to join EMU. Limits on deficit and debt levels were introduced (at 3 per cent and 60 per cent of GDP, respectively). In 1997, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) complemented these criteria by setting a medium term target of a budgetary position close to balance or in surplus, with a view to permanently restraining deficit and debt while allowing room for fiscal stabilisation.
Over the 1990s EMU fiscal rules were quite successful in inducing all EU countries to improve their budgets. The euro area deficit declined from about 5 per cent of GDP to 1 per cent in 2000. However, in recent years the issue of tax reforms gained prominence and tax cuts were introduced in several countries. Together with the slowdown of the economy in 2002, these cuts reversed the deficit reduction process.
In 2002 and 2003 France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy recorded budget deficits which were clearly inconsistent with the close-to-balance clause of the SGP; in the first four countries the deficit reached or exceeded 3 per cent of GDP. Moreover, one-off measures have been extensively used to meet budgetary targets. New accounting and financial operations -which, even if formally consistent with EMU rules, do not improve the underlying public finance conditions -have also been relied upon.
The SGP is now widely criticised. It is argued that it reduces budget flexibility, discourages public investment, disregards the aggregate fiscal stance and works 1 See Kopits and Symansky (1998), Balassone and Franco (2001a) , Giordano (2003) and the papers in Banca d'Italia (2001). 2 See Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (1989) and European Commission (1990). Canzoneri and Diba (2001, 71) note that "… the central bankers who wrote the Delors Report knew that it was impossible to make the ECB totally immune from external pressures".
asymmetrically over the cycle. 3 The current framework may come under further pressure because of the EU enlargement.
The debate about the future of the SGP is quite open. Not all the criticisms are warranted and no alternative rule clearly dominates the present one. In the end, the European governments may retain the SGP in view of its capacity to combine fiscal discipline and flexibility, of the budgetary risks coming from population ageing and of the difficulty to reach an agreement about an alternative set of rules. However, there is also the possibility that the SGP survives but becomes an empty shell.
In this context it is important to consider whether there is a fall-back solution, i.e. whether financial market mechanisms linking higher deficits to higher interest rates can put pressure on governments to correct fiscal misbehaviour.
In this paper we tackle this issue in three steps. First we examine the institutional requisites for a market mechanism to be effective at disciplining fiscal policy and check whether such requisites are met in the current European setting (section 2). Second, we explore the theoretical and empirical link between a country's fiscal record, the rating of its debt and the risk premium embodied in the interest rates it is demanded to pay (section 3). Third, we discuss, also by looking at few case-studies, the factors determining governments' sensitivity to market signals and their willingness to change their fiscal stance accordingly (section 4).
2 Pre-requisites for market effectiveness 2.1 Theory -Default premia and credit constraints could in principle discipline irresponsible sovereign borrowers. Market-based fiscal discipline would initially take the form of a rising interest premium on the debt of a country running excessive deficits. If these deficits persisted, the interest premium would increase at an increasing rate until, eventually, the offending country could be denied access to additional credit. The increase in the cost of borrowing along with the threat of reduced availability of credit would then provide the incentive to correct irresponsible fiscal behaviour. The key question is whether and under what conditions will credit markets provide sufficient incentives to restrain irresponsible borrowing. Bishop, Damrau and Miller (1989) indicate four conditions to be met for the market to be effective: a) there is freedom of movement of capital; b) full information on sovereign borrowers is available; c) the market assumes that there is no external guarantee and no possibility of monetisation; d) the financial system can absorb the bankruptcy of a sovereign borrower. 3 For a review and an assessment of the debate see Buti, Eijffinger and Franco (2003) and Franco, Balassone and Francese (2003) . 4 A similar issue arises in decentralised countries where sub-national governments' fiscal discipline can be ensured via either market incentives or fiscal rules. See Balassone and Franco (2001b) Lane (1993) identifies the following four necessary conditions: a) no government unit should have privileged access to the market; b) the market must have access to all the information necessary to evaluate the financial reliability of each unit; c) the bailing-out of troubled government units must not be allowed d) borrowers must respond to market signals.
The two sets of conditions are similar. Both cases require that the central bank is independent.
Privileged access may take different forms: direct financing by Central Banks, preferred financing by banks, differential treatment of public bonds with respect to the tax system or to accounting rules.
The evaluation of a government's financial situation can be hindered by insufficient information and/or by "creative accounting". Difficulties may be amplified by differences between public and business accounting rules.
The credibility of the ban on bail-outs depends on both the capability of the financial system to withstand the failure of a "large" borrower and on the role played by governments in providing main public services and goods. A sovereign borrower may get too big for any market and may be directly responsible for the provision of essential services so that the costs of a bailout may be outweighed by those of its failure. The nobail-out clause would consequently become an empty shell.
According to Lane (1993) , if any of the three conditions above is not met, market signals risk coming too late and the change in market perception of the state of government finances may change too suddenly with possibly disruptive consequences.
The European Case -
The possibility to rely on market induced fiscal discipline was considered when defining the conditions to be met by a country before joining EMU.
Advocates of the market approach argued that the effectiveness of market discipline would have been enhanced in EMU both by the likely higher capital mobility induced by the single currency and by the credibility of the no-bail-out commitment, supported at the Treaty level, by both member states and the ECB. The EMU wide capital market would have also been more robust to shocks caused by borrowers' failure (Bishop et al., 1989) . CEPR (1991) argued that market reactions would have been not sufficient to tackle the problem of fiscal discipline in a monetary union. It noted that "the true sanction -the denial of further lending -comes too late and too abruptly. There is a quantum jump between rising rates of interest and the inability to borrow" (p. 34). It also noted that "the mere threat of a liquidity crisis may prompt financial intermediaries to act in anticipation and deny further lending at a relatively early stage" (p. 34). However, CEPR also suggested that these shortcomings could have been corrected by introducing proper prudential rules for the financial systems and rejected fiscal rules as unnecessary and unwise.
The Delors Committee acknowledged that market forces can exert a disciplinary influence but noted that the "constraints imposed by market forces might either be too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive" (Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, 1989, p. 24). The Committee concluded that countries in EMU should have accepted some constraints on their fiscal policy. Lamfalussy, 1989 pointed out that closer economic integration might generate expectations that a country in critical conditions would in the end be bailed out by the other countries. For this reason the fiscal stance of governments might have not been fully embedded in credit risk premia.
The European Commission (1990) took a similar view: financial markets differentiate among sovereign borrowers, but "it cannot be taken for granted that market discipline would be sufficient, due to expectations of Community assistance and/or inadequate response of governments to market signals" (p. 112). It concluded that there was a need for rules and procedures at the Community level.
These views are to be considered in the context of the period. Several of the founding members of the EMU had bad fiscal records. Widening general government deficits and corresponding rises in government debt were observed in many countries till the early 1990s. Between 1989 and 1993 public deficits in the EU as a whole increased by 3.8 percentage points, to 6.0 per cent of GDP. Debt to GDP ratios were also on an upward path in most countries. For the Union as a whole, the debt ratio rose from 54 per cent in 1989 to 72 per cent in 1996. Some countries had two-digit deficit ratios and debt ratios above 100 per cent. These circumstances did not suggest that market discipline had been especially effective in Europe.
Moreover, accounting practices for general government were not homogeneous across Europe, even in national accounts, thus providing further obstacles to effective risk assessment by market agencies and investors.
In the end, regulation was seen as a necessary supplement to market forces.
The crisis in which the SGP has plunged in 2003 induces to reconsider the issue.
As to the conditions laid down by Bishop et al. (1989) and Lane (1993) , the situation is differentiated. Some conditions are fulfilled, others remain problematic.
In the EMU framework, the freedom of movement of capital is ensured and governments' privileged access to the market is not allowed. As to the latter aspect, the Maastricht Treaty established the independence of the European Central Bank, prohibited the ECB and the National Central Banks from directly financing governments and prohibited governments from having privileged access to the financial market.
Seven years after the start-up of EMU the information available to market agents on government finance has greatly improved. Thanks also to the statistical requirements provided for by the Treaty and the SGP, homogeneity in accounts has markedly increased. Controls on the accounts are routinely conducted by Eurostat and the European Commission. However, some problems remain open. In order to meet the short term targets, countries have frequently adopted one-off cash-raising measures instead of making the necessary structural adjustment. Monitoring has been hampered by delays in data provision, with the implication that the whistle has often been blown far too late. Data on off-budget liabilities and budgetary prospects have generally been rather limited.
The credibility of the no-bail-out commitment still remains an open issue, at least for large highly indebted countries playing a major role even in the large European financial market. Still in 1997 the IMF noticed that "although the no-bailout clause in the Maastricht Treaty rules out the possibility of direct EU assistance to individual EU member countries, it is unlikely that market participants will price sovereign debt as if it were corporate debt" (IMF, 1997, p. 192) . After 1997 interest rate spreads among European sovereign borrowers have declined markedly. This may reflect either the trust of markets in the disciplining effect of EMU fiscal framework or their expectation of a (at least partial) bail-out for high debt countries in case of difficulties.
Fiscal Conditions, Credit Ratings and Risk Premia
Governments can reduce the real value of their current liabilities in two ways. They can increase inflation above what was expected by the market at the time government bonds were issued, so that the nominal interest rate does not entirely reflect effective inflation. Alternatively, they can repudiate their debt, either in the form of a simple cancellation by law of their debt obligations or of some tax with retroactive effects on debt repayments.
Both inflation and default risks are priced by the market. When investors perceive such risks they ask compensation for them, which raises the cost of government debt service.
The inflation risk can be eliminated or reduced by issuing government debt denominated in domestic currency and indexed to domestic inflation, by issuing debt denominated in foreign currency (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990) , by shortening the maturity of government debt (Missale and Blanchard, 1990 ). The default risk increases when devaluation by means of inflation is not allowed; it can be reduced by lengthening the maturity of public debt (Drudi and Giordano, 2000) .
Before EMU, yield differentials within Euro area countries were determined, in addition to inflation and default risk, by expected exchange rate movements (which should also incorporate inflation expectations), differences in tax treatments and liquidity.
The loss of monetary sovereignty has made it impossible for EMU countries to pursue independent inflation policies and has enhanced the exposure of EMU national governments to default risk. Since inflation risk is likely to be the same for every country in the EMU zone, intra-EMU exchange risk is zero and tax treatments are harmonised across countries belonging to the Union, yield differentials in the area should mainly reflect differences in creditworthiness and liquidity.
Identifying and measuring the impact of each determinant of yield differentials is not easy. In empirical studies this task has been typically accomplished by using different definitions of spreads, which however are all somehow problematic. Creditworthiness has often been related to: a) debt level, composition and rate of change; b) institutions and rules; c) macroeconomic conditions. Information on country risk is also available to market participants via credit ratings produced by specialised agencies. Such ratings are based, for the most, on the analysis of few macroeconomic variables.
In the sections which follow we examine the determinants and characteristics of sovereign ratings and review the results obtained by a number of selected empirical studies aiming at testing whether and to what extent fiscal fundamentals are priced by the market (a summary of the results obtained for EU countries is also presented in Table 1A at the end of the paper). We supplement this analysis with an heuristic examination of available data.
3.1 Sovereign ratings -Ratings are summary measures of assessments over the probability that a borrower will default. Given the large economies of scale in processing the information to assign ratings and the time necessary to build up the needed reputation, the rating industry is highly concentrated. There are only three agencies performing a significant world-wide activity (Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch-IBCA). In general ratings assigned to the same borrower do not differ much.
Ratings are strongly inversely correlated to yields. The relationship is non linear, i.e. increases in yield corresponding to a single notch decrease in rating get larger as the rating worsens.
Furthermore, ratings may affect the number of potential investors either discouraging the more risk-averse or because statutes and regulations of some investors demand higher provisions for lower rating assets and do not allow to buy assets carrying ratings below a certain level (Dale and Thomas, 1991; Cantor and Packer, 1997). 5 The extent to which ratings reinforce market signals also depends on whether the rating agencies lead the market (thereby conveying additional information to market participants) rather than follow it (thereby simply summarising information already available to market participants).
In their statements on rating criteria major agencies list numerous economic, social and political factors. However the relative weight given to each factor is difficult to assess as some factors are difficult to quantify 6 and agencies, for obvious reasons, provide relatively little guidance on the issue (Standard & Poor's, 1994; Huhne, 1996; Truglia, 1998).
Cantor and Packer (1996) focus on "eight variables that are repeatedly cited as determinants of sovereign ratings" (p. 77): per capita income, GDP growth, inflation, central government debt, external balance, foreign currency debt, economic development and default history. They run OLS regressions relating Moody's and Standard & Poor's ratings to these 8 variables for a sample of 49 countries and find that they explain more than 90% of the sample variation. Somewhat surprisingly, however, central government debt turns out not to be significant. Sy (2001) reports the findings of a follow up study whereby the factors identified by Cantor and Packer continue to adequately explain ratings in 1996 and in 1997. The relationship breaks down in 1998 though, in the wake of the Asian crisis.
Indeed, the reliability of ratings as indicators of the probability of a crisis and, possibly, of a default has been questioned after the Asian crisis. Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) 5 In this respect it should be noted that the Basel accord introduces the use the credit assessment of the leading rating agencies for determining risk weights for sovereign bonds. Only sovereign bonds rated AA or more would get a zero risk weight. Below that rating level the risk weight rises gradually. 6 Beers (1997), after explaining that the S&P ratings are a summary measure of scores assigned to a number of factors determining economic and political risks, points out that "there is, however, no exact formula combining the scores to determine ratings" (p. 462).
argue that "credit rating agencies aggravated the East Asian crisis. In fact, having failed to predict the emergence of the crisis, rating agencies became excessively conservative. They downgraded East Asian crisis countries more than the worsening in these countries' economic fundamentals would justify" (p. 335). 7 The inability of rating agencies to forecast the East Asian crisis has been stressed by international financial institutions (BIS, 1998; IMF, 1998, World Bank, 1998) and acknowledged by the agencies, which after the crisis revised their rating models to give more weight to short-term foreign currency debt (Fitch-IBCA, 1998; Truglia, 1998).
Reisen (2000) argues that there are reasons to have less confidence in sovereign ratings than in US corporate ratings and that pricing in markets reflects these lower degree of confidence, as the correlation between ratings and yields is lower for sovereign than for corporate bonds. He takes a rather pessimistic view by arguing that "sovereign ratings lag rather than lead the markets" and that "it seems that there is little scope to improve on that performance" (p. 77).
However, there is some evidence that ratings lead the market.
Cantor and Packer (1996) find evidence that not only ratings are highly correlated with yield spreads 8 but also that rating announcements may cause a change in the market's assessment of sovereign risk. They find that changes in ratings are anticipated by the market in the sense that relative spreads increase (decrease) in the month preceding a downgrading (upgrading). However, they also find that spreads increase (decrease) further after the announcement of the downgrading (upgrading.). These results are essentially confirmed by Reiser and von Maltzan (1999).
Standard and Poor's (1994) reports that yields are relatively insensitive to downgrading as long as the ratings stays above-investment-grade, while yields become very responsive to even small downgrading when the rating plunges below-investment-grade. This is confirmed by Ferri et al. (1999) . They analyse the impact of downgradings during the East Asian crisis (which were large, down to the lower B-notches and even into C-notches) and find that "after the downgrading the yield spread of East Asian crisis countries' bonds denominated in USD with respect to US Treasury bonds of equivalent maturity significantly rose" (p. 343).
Larrain, Reisen and von Maltzan (1997) find that rating changes Granger-caused yield spreads during the Asian crisis. However, Reisen and von Maltzan (1999) run a Granger causality test correcting for joint determinants of ratings and spreads and find that sovereign ratings are mutually interdependent with changes in bond yields. Reinhart (2002) argues that "… sovereign credit ratings systematically fail to anticipate currency crises but do considerably better predicting defaults" (p. 21). She points out, however, that downgrading usually follows currency crises, possibly highlighting how currency instability increases default risk.
Overall the available evidence seems to suggest that the credit rating system is effective in signalling fiscal crisis which are well under way, but cannot be relied upon to anticipate crisis at an early stage. 7 See also Ruggerone (2003) . 8 They find that ratings alone explain a higher percentage of variation of yield spreads in their sample than the eight macroeconomic variables on which they base their rating analysis.
Yield Spreads -Several papers have investigated interest rate spreads in recent
years. This section examines three strands of empirical work, referring to the US experience, to OECD and EU countries.
States and municipalities in the USA -Drawing on a set of survey data on general obligation bond yields for US states, 9 Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) test the "market discipline hypothesis". They focus on an important aspect of such hypothesis, that is the existence of a non-linear relationship between yields and debt variables. Bayoumi et al. (1995) specify an equation for the yield spread (relative to the yield on the New Jersey bond) that includes, in addition to state tax rates and the ratio of state debt to trend gross state product, the unemployment rate, to account for cyclical factors, and a measure of the strength of constitutional constraints on state borrowing. There are two coefficients associated with debt, respectively measuring the level effect of debt on yields and the non-linearity caused by the interaction between yields and interest payments. 10 The results are broadly consistent with the market discipline hypothesis. All coefficients, with the exception of that on the tax rate, turn out to be significant at conventional levels. More interestingly, the statistical significance and the point estimates of the second coefficient on debt imply a highly non-linear supply curve. 11 The authors thus conclude that credit markets do appear to provide incentives for sovereign borrowers to restrain borrowing.
Capeci (1991) considers general obligation issues by 136 US municipalities in 1982 and
1987 to investigate how the market reacts to changes in credit quality, both directly and indirectly through changes in credit ratings. He finds that both the credit rating and the cost of borrowing are sensitive to changes in the fiscal condition of the issuer (in particular, the size of its tax base and its debt burden). The effects of changes in the rating on the cost of borrowing are less clear.
OECD countries -Alesina, de Broeck, Prati and Tabellini (1992) investigate whether high debt countries pay a default risk premium on their debt by comparing the interest rates on public and private financial instruments denominated in the same currencies in 12 OECD countries over the period 1974-89. In particular, they measure the default risk either by the difference between the public interest rate and the private interest rate or by the ratio of the two of them. The problem with these measures is that they depend on changes in private risk. Moreover they cannot distinguish between credit risk and 9 The sample consists of 38 states over the period 1981-90 (380 observations). 10 The right-hand side of their supply function contains, in addition to a constant and annual dummy variables, a ratio where in the numerator appears the sum of all explicative variables, including the quantity of outstanding debt (B); in the denominator there is the term 1-B. The equation is estimated using non-linear, two-stage least squares. If the estimated coefficient on B in the denominator, , turns out to be zero, then the supply function is linear, implying that the market will accept any level of debt at a constantly increasing default premium. If, instead, the coefficient is greater than zero, the supply function is non-linear with a maximum quantity supplied given by 1over the estimated coefficient. 11 The mean debt ratio in the sample is 2.3 percent, with a maximum and minimum of 7.1 and 0.2 percent. The mean yield spread is 32.4 basis points; the maximum spread is 146.4. At the mean values of the sample, each percentage point increase in the debt ratio raises the yield by 23 basis point, but the slope rises to over 35 points at debt levels which are one standard deviation above the mean. A backward bend in the supply curve occurs at a level of debt equal to 8.7 percent of gross state product, about 25 percent higher the maximum debt observed in the sample.
liquidity risk.
Alesina et al. (1992) find that in countries with high public debt the spread between public and private rates of return is positively related to the size of outstanding debt and its rate of growth. This is not the case in countries with a stable and sustainable debt to GDP ratio. The evidence thus suggests that the markets perceive a default risk on the public debt of some OECD countries. The strength of the correlation and the size of the default risk is however very small. 12 Caselli, Giovannini and Lane (1998) examine a panel of OECD countries over the period 1970-1991. They find that the cost of servicing public debt depends on primary balance, debt level, inflation and growth. The debt level has a relatively large effect in high-debt countries.
EU countries -Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) analyse the determinants of market's perception of government creditworthiness using an unbalanced panel of 13 EU member countries over the period 1987-96. Following Alesina et al. (1992) , they aim at explaining public/private sector yield differentials by means of variables that measure the size of government. In contrast to Alesina et al. (1992) , they measure the default risk by the spread of 10-year benchmark government bond yields over the corresponding swap yield of the same maturity denominated in the same currency. 13 Since the private risks entailed in interest rate swap yields are significantly lower than in corporate bond rates (there is no principal at risk in an interest rate swap) this measure is less sensitive to changes in private risk. However, like in Alesina et al. (1992) , the measure cannot distinguish between credit risk and liquidity risk.
Lemmen and Goodhart consider the following determinants of the default risk: (i) the government's tax raising capability, measured as the difference between the highest level of general government current receipts and current receipts (as a percentage of GDP); (ii) the debt to GDP ratio; (iii) political conditions that affect the country's creditworthiness, measured by the variability of inflation; (iv) the government's capacity to increase seigniorage revenue, measured by lagged inflation.
The results show that the risk of government default depends positively on the first difference of the debt to GDP ratio and the variability of inflation. As expected, inflation and the first difference of taxable capacity are found to significantly reduce the risk. 14 Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) recognise that interest rates on euro-denominated bonds issued by different governments have not fully converged and try to assess the relative importance of differences in creditworthiness of sovereign issuers and differences in liquidity in determining the observed interest rate spreads. 15 Like in Lemmen and Goodhart (1999), Codogno et al. (2003) measure the default risk by the spread of 10-year benchmark government bond yields over the corresponding rate estimated on swap contracts. In addition to the deviation of each country's debt to GDP ratio from Germany's one, their specification includes variables approximating banking and corporate sector risk premia in the US, which are meant to account for international exogenous risk. 16 These variables appear in the regression both linearly and interacted with the deviation of debt ratios in order to test whether the impact of international factors on yield differentials depends on local fiscal fundamentals. Codogno et al. (2003) find that the market perception of the default risk is an important component of yield differentials only in some countries. In particular, they find that for most countries differences in debt to GDP ratios have no significant effects on relative asset swap spread when considered separately. However, for Austria, Italy and Spain, deviations in debt ratios are significant in the specification that includes their interaction with international risk variables. Furthermore, in the case of Italy and Spain a substantial part of total yield differential can be attributed to the default risk. In contrast, the international risk factors enter significantly in the linear specification for all countries except Italy and Spain. Liquidity factors play in general a smaller role.
The latter finding contrasts with those of Bernoth (2002) , who examines a sample of bonds issued by the 15 EU governments in the period 1991-2002 in US dollars and in Deutsche Mark or Euro (after 1998). He shows that the bond yield spread depends both on the fiscal conditions (debt ratio, deficit ratio, debt service to revenue level) of the issuer country and the liquidity of the bond market, so that some countries with a more liquid market can pay a lower interest rate in spite of a higher debt ratio.
A similar point is made by FitchRatings (2004), which observes that spreads on euroarea government bonds seem to be driven as much by liquidity as credit risk and notes that Finland and Ireland, both solid AAA sovereigns, are paying 20-25 basis points over German Bunds on 10-year debt and only a few basis points less than AA Belgium. Italy continues to pay 15-20 basis points more than the cheapest governments.
Lønning (2000) compares the yields on Deutsche Mark denominated bonds issued in 11 EU countries with those on equivalent German government bonds over the 1994-96 period. 17 He regresses the yield differentials against variables supposed to be relevant factors affecting the risk of default, such as the government debt, the budget deficit, the structural budget deficit, the current account and the country rating. The coefficients of these variables generally have the expected sign. The coefficient for rating is always significant, whereas coefficients for other variables are either significant or not 15 As the variability of both credit risk and liquidity over the sample period (1991-2002) is limited, they focus on fluctuations rather than levels of the spreads. Moreover, as liquidity-related variables affect yields at high frequencies while risk-related variables are only observed at low frequencies, they address the effect of fiscal fundamentals on credit risk using monthly data and evaluate the effect of liquidity factors in daily data. 16 The variables in the baseline specification are: the spread between ten-year fixed interest rates on US swaps and the yield on ten-year US government bonds; the spread between the yield on Moody's Seasoned AAA US corporate bonds and the yield on ten-year US government bonds. 17 Data for government bonds with large enough issues (at least 1 billion Deutsche mark) are found for 13 national bonds. Observations are annual.
significant depending on what variables are included. The author interprets this finding as evidence both that rating conveys information about default risk beyond the information contained in the macroeconomic variables included in the regression, and that markets and rating agencies differ in their evaluation of default risk. The results suggest that at least part of the yield differentials on government debt between countries is a default premium. However, like in other studies, default premia turn out to be quite small.
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A summing up -Determinants of creditworthiness have a relatively strong impact on spreads for US state and municipal bonds where the yield curve bends backward at relatively low levels of debt. This can be taken as evidence of low risk of disruptive effects from delayed market signals. However, the impact of determinants of creditworthiness is much smaller in the EU where small yield spreads are observed even in correspondence of high debt to GDP ratios. This difference may reflect the different rank of the borrowers: municipalities rather than sovereign countries. The effectiveness of credit markets in imposing fiscal discipline on governments seems to depend on the level and structure of government.
According to FitchRating (2004), 15-20 basis points is perhaps the most that could be attributed to credit differentials between AAA and AA euro-area governments. The spread between AAA and AA US States is only about half this size. FitchRatings concludes that it is unlikely that financial markets can give a strong incentive for fiscal discipline to euro-area sovereign borrowers, since "a euro-area government whose budgetary position weakens is likely to have to pay more for its debt, but that the extra cost will be small."
3.3 A look at the data -In this section we present some evidence on the developments over the period 1980-2003 in spreads between EU government bond yields, in sovereign credit ratings, as well as in some fiscal variables, which may have had a role in determining the market perception of sovereign creditworthiness.
In the sample period German long-term bond yields have usually been the lowest. 19 The spreads in long-term government bond yields between Germany and Euro area countries reduced markedly over the last two decades. 20 A similar pattern can be observed for the three EU countries which have not joined the monetary union, Denmark, Sweden and UK (Fig.1) .
The reduction in government bond yields during the 1980s was mainly driven by the sharp decrease in inflation in high yield countries; the average spread between EU countries and Germany dropped by 2.4 percentage points, to 1.9 percent ( Table 1) . The convergence was faster in the period 1992-98, as the introduction of the common currency approached; the average spread reached 46 basis points at the end of 1998 (24 points, excluding Greece that joined EMU two years later, on January 1 st 2001). From 1999 onwards the spreads continued to narrow, although not in a continuous manner. At the beginning of 2004 there still remained small differences in yields, suggesting that 18 In the paper the author reports the result of a rough numerical example, which suggests a default premium of about 20 basis points, which compares with a maximum difference of 34 points in the interest rate on European government bonds included in the sample. 19 There are only a few episodes in which Luxembourg and the Netherlands have lower yields. 20 Long-term government bonds are typically ten-year bonds or bonds with the closest available maturity. differences in liquidity and credit risk between euro-area countries are still present.
Sovereign risk, as assessed by rating agencies, exhibits a similar evolution. In the analysis that follows we refer to the index of global creditworthiness measured semiannually in Institutional Investor's Country Credit survey of sovereign risk experts at financial institutions around the world. 21 Compared with Moody's and Standard and Poor's ratings, this index exhibits a much higher variability and is available for a longer period.
In Fig. 2 and Table 2 we report sovereign risk (computed as 100 minus the credit rating) differentials against Germany. Germany has always been the country with the lowest chance of default in the sample, with the exception of 2003, when its credit risk ranked above the average. Also country ratings have converged over the last two decades. The average differential against Germany decreased by 6.3 points in the period 1980-91, and by almost 3 additional points over the years preceding the monetary union (1992-98). However, in contrast to government bond yields, the largest drop (from a positive differential of 11.4 points to a negative one of 0.5) occurred in the last five years. Interestingly, in line with some of the empirical findings discussed above, convergence in credit ratings seems to have followed that in interest rates.
Finally, a comparison of Table 1 and Table 2 shows that at the end of 2003, whereas the three EU countries which did not join the monetary union exhibit the highest yield spread against Germany, their sovereign rating is among the highest in the sample. This seems to suggest that what the market is pricing in these case is the inflation (or exchange rate) risk.
A scatter-plot of the sovereign credit risk differentials against government bond yield spreads shows the positive relationship between the two series (Fig. 3) . The results of simple regressions of yield spreads against rating differentials using different samples are reported in Table 2A in the appendix. The correlation index between credit risk and yield differentials is 0.73 in the overall sample period. 22 It is highest in the years 1992-98 (0.77); in the period 1999-2003 it is lower (0.67), reflecting the fact that in the years preceding the monetary union agency ratings got very much along market perception, whereas in the following years ratings continued to converge while full convergence in interest rates had virtually already been achieved. This is particularly evident if we exclude Greece from the sample, in which case the correlation in the last 5 years of the sample drops to 0.32. The correlation in the overall period remains the same (0.73) if we restrict the sample to the high-debt countries (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands). However, in this case the correlation is highest in the period 1999-2003 (0.85), and remains so even if we exclude Greece from the sample. Since in monetary union differences in inflation and/or exchange rate risks, as well as in tax treatment, are no longer relevant, default risk is expected to account for a much larger share of the yield spread now than in the past. Finding a higher correlation between credit rating and yield spreads in the post-EMU period in high-debt countries somehow confirms this 21 The country credit ratings developed by Institutional Investor are based on information provided by senior economists and sovereign-risk analyst at leading global banks and money management and securities firms. They grade each country on a scale of zero to 100, with 100 representing the countries that have the least chance of default. The ratings are released every year in March and September. 22 The correlation remains above 0.7 even if we exclude Greece, which is to some extent an outlier.
expectation.
In the analysis that follows we focus on the relationships between the measures of government bonds yield spread and credit risk we employed so far and some fiscal variables. In order to explain the movements in either the yield spread or in the rating we alternatively consider the change in the debt to GDP ratio or the net borrowing, as these are the variables which the data suggest having the biggest impact on yield spreads and credit rating. 23 In the regressions with the yield spread as the dependent variable the change in the debt to GDP ratio and the net borrowing are considered in deviation from the German ones; furthermore, the inflation differential with respect to Germany is included as an additional explicative variable. Also following the evidence, we consider the contemporaneous relationship between yield spreads and fiscal variables, whereas we look at the impact of fiscal outturns on the rating released one period ahead. The results of all regressions, using different measures of the fiscal condition and different samples, are shown in Tables 3A and 4A in the appendix. 25 All measures of fiscal condition appear significantly and positively correlated both with the government bond yield spread and the credit risk. The relationship is generally stronger in the subsample of high debt countries and in the period 1992-98. The causal link between the relevant variables, especially for high-debt countries in the years preceding the monetary union, is however dubious. Rating, spread and fiscal variables in years 1992-98 appear to move all in the same direction, perhaps suggesting that in that period both rating agencies and markets were looking at the same signals (i.e., fiscal developments) to assess a probability with which the country would have succeeded in joining the union. Net borrowing in year t explains 31% of the variation in the credit rating in year t+1 in the entire sample and 34% of the variation in the sub-sample of high-debt countries. As expected, yield spread is strongly and significantly related to inflation differential, particularly in the nineties. Altogether inflation and net borrowing differentials explain 65% of the contemporaneous variation in the yield spread in the entire sample, 77% for high debt countries. Even controlling for inflation, the impact of fiscal conditions appears quantitatively large. In the entire sample, a 1 percentage point increase in the net borrowing differential makes the spread increase by 23 basis points; in the sub-sample of high-debt countries the impact is larger (31 basis points). However, in the period 1999-2002, where the spread should mainly account for differences in creditworthiness (and liquidity), the relationship is much weaker and almost never significant. The same qualitative results apply if we use the change in debt to GDP ratio as the explanatory variable. 23 We also considered the impact of changes in the debt to GDP ratio (or of the net borrowing) on changes (rather than levels) in yield spreads or in ratings. None of these relationships turned out to be significant. 24 We analyse the impact of a change in debt to GDP ratio (or of net borrowing) at the end of year t on the rating released in September of the year t+1. 25 The results presented here are obtained using simple OLS regressions. They do not change qualitatively if we perform a panel analysis using randomd effect GLS estimation instead. Indeed, the within-country R-squared is generally significantly higher than the one obtained using OLS regression, above all in the sub-sample of high-debt countries.
Government's Sensitivity to Market signals
In the previous section we have analysed the literature and the data in search for evidence on whether the necessary conditions for an effective market discipline are generally met. Indeed, we have found that the market provides the right signals to sovereign borrowers.
However, this alone is not sufficient to ensure the effectiveness of market discipline. Lane (1993) also stresses the importance of governments' sensitivity to market signals, that is whether, by how much and how quickly do sovereign borrowers respond to market incentives.
Policy-makers' reaction time may be excessively long if they have short time horizons. The debt structure also contributes to it. While the increase in yields on new bonds may immediately signal market's reaction to excessive borrowing, the burden on the budget may increase slowly if most of the debt is made of long-term bonds. In the case of Italy, which is the country where -due to the relatively short duration of debt and to its high level -the impact of a change in interest rates is strongest, a 1 percentage point increase in the interest rate on all maturities will only induce an increase in interest expenditure of 0.2 percentage points of GDP in the first year and 0.5 in the second year, while it will take many years for the rise to exert its full impact.
FitchRatings (2004) considers, as an example, an AAA country with debt increasing up to 100% of GDP. The country may be downgraded to AA and its spread may widen by 20 basis points. FitchRatings notes that the annual interest costs will eventually rise by 0.2% of GDP. It concludes that this extra-burden might add little to the pressures the country's government would be feeling, and it is certainly not enough to ensure that market forces can discipline governments where the SGP has failed.
A descriptive analysis -Some indications on the reactions of policy makers to
market signals may be obtained by studying the cases of the four EU countries whose debt reached above 100 per cent of GDP in the 1980s or in the 1990s: Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Italy (Table 3) .
Belgium -In Belgium the debt to GDP ratio was 67.9 per cent in 1969 and was on a declining path until 1974, when it reached a low of 57.8 per cent. Over the same years the spread between the yield of 10-years Belgian Government bonds and the corresponding yield on German bonds was negative except for 1969.
After 1974 the debt ratio grew fast. In 1980 it amounted to 77.6 per cent. The yield spread with respect to Germany turned positive: in 1980 it was 4 percentage points. In six years the debt ratio grew by 20 points and the yield spread by 5.
Notwithstanding the rise in spreads, Belgium ran deficits averaging at 12 per cent of GDP in the following three years. The debt to GDP ratio grew by almost 25 points, to 112 per cent in 1983. The yield spread reached a peak of 5.3 points in 1982. The rating also declined sharply, from 86.9 in 1980 to 74.2 in 1982.
It Only in 1987 did the primary balance turn into a surplus, which became sizeable the following year and remained so thereafter. In the first half of the 1990s the debt ratio was about 90 per cent. The yield spread declined to about 1 percentage point. The rating went back to the 1980 level. Since then extremely high growth rates accelerated markedly the process of debt reduction: in 2002 the debt ratio was 33.4 per cent, the yield spread was down to 0.1 points and the rating improved to 88.5.
Italy -In Italy fiscal conditions started deteriorating in the first half of the 1970s, with the deficit ratio reaching almost 7 per cent and the debt ratio growing by more than 13 points (to 51.4 per cent) between 1970 and 1974. The yield spread with respect to Germany remained low in this period but rose sharply thereafter, reaching 8.6 points in 1977.
Between 1975 and 1980, the deficit ratio was on average 8 per cent of GDP. The debt ratio was close to 60 per cent. The yield spread remained at about 8 points. In 1980 Italy's rating was 75.8.
Italy kept recording two digits deficit ratios well into the 1990s. The debt to GDP ratio peaked at 124.3 in 1994. Mainly due to a relatively sharp decline in the inflation rate, the yield spread, after an increase to 13 points in 1983, declined to 3.3 points in 1986. At the same time, Italy's rating showed no significant deterioration.
The primary balance showed a surplus first in 1992, peaking at 6.7 per cent of GDP in 1997. The debt ratio declined slowly, to reach 106.7 per cent in 2003. The yield spread with respect to Germany declined further, to reach 0.2 points in 2002, and Italy's rating got as high as 86.2 in the same year.
A summing up -From this overview we may conclude that, with the exception of Italy, the deterioration in public finance conditions was readily and sizeably priced by the market. While the time elapsed until a significant fiscal correction was enacted was longest in Italy (almost 20 years), it took quite a while also in the other three countries: almost a decade in Belgium and 13-14 years in Greece and Ireland.
Moreover, for Belgium, Greece and Italy it took another decade for the primary surplus to compensate enough of the interest bill to allow the debt to GDP ratio to start declining. Belgium, Greece and Italy have been running low deficits since 1999 but their debt to GDP ratios are still about 105 per cent.
Thus, even when markets signal promptly, fiscal rules seem to have the advantage of being capable to force a more timely reaction on the part of the policy makers. In this way both the direct costs of a prolonged period of fiscal instability and the costs of the needed correction can be sizeably reduced.
A panel analysis -In this section we present the results of a panel regression
investigating the relationship between the structural primary budget balance (defined as general government net borrowing corrected for the effect of the business cycle, aiming at capturing the fiscal policy stance) and the country creditworthiness (measured by either the agency rating or the yield spread against German bonds). 27 As the aim is to test whether fiscal policy reacts to either market or agency perception of government creditworthiness, we consider one-year lagged values for the measures of credit risk. We also include among the regressors, in addition to the lagged structural primary balance, the lagged stock of debt, expecting that the presence of a high stock of debt would induce fiscal authorities to pursue more responsible policies.
The sample consists of 14 EU countries (excluding Luxembourg) over the period . 28 In the regression using the yield spread as an explicative variable we drop, of course, Germany from the sample.
Our estimating equations is the following:
where STRUCT is the structural primary balance as a percentage of GDP, DEBT is the debt to GDP ratio and RISK is the credit risk, measured alternatively by the Institutional Investor country risk assessment or the government bond yield spread against Germany.
Given the presence of the lagged dependent variable among the regressors we apply the Arellano-Bond fixed-effects dynamic panel estimation. 29 The results obtained by using the yield spread as a measure of the credit risk are presented in Table 5A at the end of the paper. Table 6A reports the results when the credit risk is measured by the country rating.
All coefficients come out with the expected sign in almost all regressions. For the whole sample the estimated coefficient of lagged primary deficit is 0.68, significantly different from zero and lower than one as expected, both when we use the yield spread and the country risk among the explicative variables. The estimated coefficient on lagged debt is -0.04 in both regressions, significantly different from zero and negative as expected. Also the coefficient on the lagged measure of perceived risk is almost always negative as expected (with the exception of the sub-period 1992-98), not always significant though, suggesting that fiscal authorities may have only occasionally reacted to market's or agencies' perception of country creditworthiness.
The relationship appears more robust between primary deficit and yield spread than between primary deficit and credit rating, quantitatively stronger and more significant over the sub-period 1999-2003 in the highly indebted countries. In the entire sample, a one-percentage-point increase in the yield spread in one year seems to induce governments to improve the structural primary balance in the following year by 0.17 percentage points of GDP. Fiscal authorities' reaction rises to 0.68 points of GDP if we look at the sub-sample of high-debt countries in the years 1999-2003. However, being recent years characterised by decreasing yield spread in the high-debt country, some kind of asymmetric reaction by governments to favourable and unfavourable developments of the macroeconomic conditions may have determined these results. A high negative coefficient may indeed reveal a loosening in fiscal policies induced by lower interest rates, rather than a general attitude of governments to promptly and strongly react to signals of decreased creditworthiness.
Conclusions
The possibility of relying on market mechanisms to provide effective incentives to fiscal discipline was assessed in depth in the late 1980s when the EMU was designed.
At that time it was widely considered that the constraints imposed by market forces are either too slow and weak or too sudden and disruptive. In the end, fiscal rules were seen as a necessary supplement to market forces.
Today those rules are criticised and European financial markets are different from what they were 15 years ago, if not only for the greater integration brought by the common currency.
This paper aimed at re-assessing the case for financial market discipline, to see whether it can provide a fall-back solution in case of rule-failure. Our answer is again negative.
Concerning the conditions to be met for market discipline to be effective, we have argued that the evidence is mixed. Governments' privileged access to the market is not an issue. However, in spite of marked progress (mainly due to the enforcement of fiscal rules), the available information on governments' finance is still somewhat unsatisfactory. Moreover, the credibility of the no-bail-out commitment still remains an open issue.
The evidence we have examined unambiguously suggests that market rewards fiscal discipline and punishes with higher risk premia fiscal imbalances. However the same evidence also unambiguously suggests that market reactions to growing deficit and debt levels tend to be slow and small in size.
The credit rating system seems effective in signalling fiscal crisis which are well under way, but cannot be relied upon to anticipate crisis at an early stage. Determinants of creditworthiness have a relatively small impact on yield spreads across EU countries. Narrow yield spreads are observed even in correspondence of high debt to GDP ratios.
As to policy makers' reactions to market signals both the case studies and the panel analysis suggest that fiscal corrections tend to be significantly delayed even when the deterioration in public finance conditions is readily priced by the market.
FitchRatings (2004) observes that "15-20 basis points […] is perhaps the most that could be attributed to credit differentials between AAA and AA euro-area governments [and that] such amounts hardly seem likely to keep a German finance minister awake at night" (p. 6). This contemporary evidence seems to confirm results obtained by Flandreau, Cacheux and Zumer (1998) analysing European data for the 1880-1913 period: "... the gold standard experience ... supports the view that markets react to increases in debt by inflicting higher risk premia. On the other hand, countries had to plunge quite deep into debt before they started feeling the pain." (p. 145).
Identifying the way ahead was not the aim of this paper. However our analysis suggests some preliminary considerations.
In order to improve the effectiveness of market discipline, two different courses of action may be taken: a) remove the factors currently hampering the market's assessment of fiscal conditions; b) amplify the signals sent from the market to the policy makers.
The first option would entail, on the one hand, further reducing whatever room is currently left in regulation for governments' privileged access to the market and, on the other hand, increasing fiscal transparency, in order to provide citizens and markets with clear and comprehensive information.
By introducing the use of credit assessment by the leading rating agencies for determining risk weights to be attached to sovereign bonds in the context of the assessment of capital adequacy, the recent Basel accord moves a step in the right direction. 30 Another possibility would be the extension of the large exposure directive, which sets limits to the amount which can be lent to a single private borrower (no more than 25% of capital), to apply to governments too (Arnold and Lemmen, 2001 ).
Greater fiscal transparency could be achieved by providing the public with more detailed and timely statistics than those currently available. The independence of statistical institutions should be guaranteed as much as that of Central Banks. Data on public assets and liabilities should cover both financial and non-financial items and should not be restricted to general government units alone, rather their coverage should extend to the broader public sector. Estimates concerning off-budget liabilities and public guarantees should be made available. As to budget data, information should be released concerning cyclically adjusted balances and the extent of one-off revenues and expenditures. Moreover, reconcilable cash and accrual data should be available and the link between deficit and debt measures should be fully explained. Revenue and expenditure short and long term projections by level of government should be carried out and released routinely. The assumptions underlying fiscal projections should be clearly spelled out. Ex-post assessment of projections including the effects of new legislation should also become a routine exercise.
Concerning the alternative course of action (i.e. amplifying the signals sent from the market to the policy makers) several proposals have been put forward.
Most of the proposals entail the use of the excessive deficit procedure as a sort of public rating system to supplement the market one. Arnold and Lemmen (2001) suggest that the bonds of governments in excessive deficit could be shifted to a higher risk category for the purposes of assessing banks' capital adequacy. Similarly, restrictions may be introduced to the use of public bonds of governments in excessive deficit as collateral in monetary policy operations. Another option could be the introduction of joint (i.e. multicountry) issuance of public bonds from which countries in excessive deficits could be excluded.
All these proposals are problematic. They all result in making access to credit more costly for less disciplined governments, either because of technical reasons or of reputational effects. In this respect, the only way the effects of these rules may differ from rating agencies' downgrading seems to be that they are more direct and, perhaps, more visible. However, this benefit is achieved with some relevant costs in other domains.
A different suggestion is made by Bayoumi, Goldstein and Woglom (1995) who argue that a rules-based approach could use observed yield spreads rather than deficits as reference indicators. Linking fiscal rules to market signals makes the rules both less arbitrary and more flexible. Instead of using fixed limits on deficit and debt levels, in such an hypothetical context it is the market which decides whether a certain deficit or debt level (or a combination of the two) is unsustainable and, therefore, needs to be corrected. Of course, identifying the relevant spread and measuring it accurately becomes crucial. This solution would raise a number of problems. For instance, the direct effects of changes in spreads might be amplified by their effects on the implementation of EU procedures thereby getting a country in a vicious circle. Governments pursuing unsound policies might not be punished if also the reference issuer pursues an unsound policy. Governments pursuing sound fiscal policies might be punished if other factors determine a higher spread.
In the end, our conclusion is that for the time being it would be extremely risky to replace fiscal rules with market mechanisms. However, greater transparency in fiscal accounts would allow markets to usefully complement rules. 
